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ABSTRACT
Despite their many uses, small commercial Unmanned Aerial Sys-
tems (UASs) or drones pose significant security risks. There is, there-
fore, a need to find methods of detecting, localising and countering
these vehicles. This paper presents work towards autonomously
localising drone controllers from the Radio Frequency (RF) sig-
nals they emit. An RF sensor array is used to monitor the signal
spectrum. A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is trained to be
able to predict the bearing of the drone controller, relative to the
sensor, given its output. The position of the controllers can then
be calculated from these bearings, provided that at least two such
sensors are deployed a reasonable distance apart. The model is able
to achieve a mean absolute error of 3.67° in bearing calculation,
which translates into a moderate positional error of 40m at a range
of 500m.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing Methodologies → Machine learning; • Com-
puter systems organization→ Embedded and cyber-physical sys-
tems;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite their popular image as toys, commercial Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UASs or Drones) are increasingly being used in dangerous
and nefarious activities. There have been reported incidents of
drones being used to smuggle contraband into prisons in the USA,
Brazil, Ireland, Greece, Russia, Switzerland, Australia and the UK
[4, 8]. Drones are particularly useful in this setting as the smuggler
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
PRAI’18, August 2018, New Jersey, USA
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of our system. Two RF sensors
receive the signals from the UAS controller. This data is fed
into each sensor’s copy of the CNN model, which calculates
the bearing of the controller.
can deliver the contraband from a safe distance, whilst receiving
a live video feed from the drone, allowing them to respond to
conditions in the vicinity of the prison. In the UK, a single gang
was recently convicted of flying contraband worth £1 million into
prisons in 49 separate flights [4]. One prison governer in the UK has
described drones as a “gamechanger” that “came from nowhere” [4].
When drones are flown in the vicinity of airports, the consequences
can be severe. Here they pose a significant collision risk to the
larger aircraft. The scope of this problem is substantial. In the three
months from July to September 2017 alone, over 500 incidents
of “Hazardous and/or Unauthorized UAS activity” were reported
by pilots to the US Federal Aviation Authority [2]. In the United
Kingdom, the Airprox Board determined that, in 2016, there were
65 “risk-bearing” incidents between UASs and manned aircraft [7].
A threat which is yet to be fully realised is the use of drones in
terrorism and other forms of unconventional warfare. ISIS have
used drones to drop explosives on civilian and military targets in
Syria [34]. Official warnings as to the potential for the use of drones
in terrorist activities have been issued by many sources, including
a British Prime Minister [31].
Despite these risks, there exists a large number of instances in
which drones can have a dramatic, positive impact on human life.
Examples of these include the automated inspection of building
sites [28], data collection for precision agriculture [20] and search
and rescue [5]. Given these significant beneficial uses for commer-
cial UASs, a ban on the technology would be harmful. It is, therefore,
of paramount importance that technologies are developed which
can mitigate the risks of drones, whilst allowing their legitimate
and beneficial use to thrive. Due to this pressing need for effective
UAS risk mitigation techniques, significant work has already been
PRAI’18, August 2018, New Jersey, USA David Shorten, Saket Srivastava, and John Murray
Figure 2:Waterfall diagrams of the RF power spectrumwhile a DJI Inspire 1was flying. Time is represented on the vertical axis
and frequency on the horizontal. Colour represents the RF power at that point in time and frequency, white being the lowest
and blue the highest. We have also included a diagram of the discretisation process of the signal into frequency bin, at a given
point in time. The bins in which the control signals reside can be found from their higher power, and their corresponding
angles extracted.
conducted towards their development. We identify two principle
components to the mitigation of risks from UASs. The first of these
is the detection of the presence of the UAS together with the lo-
calisation of the vehicle and controller. The second is interdiction
methods which are required in order to destroy, capture, or hinder
the normal operation of the drone. This work focuses on a method
for the localisation of UAS controllers. It is worth mentioning that,
in some contexts, the interdiction of the drone is not of paramount
importance. For example, in the case of prison contraband smug-
gling, whilst the primary focus is to stop contraband entering the
prisons, the secondary goal is to apprehend the criminal gangs
who are orchestrating these smuggling crimes. Similarly, in the
context of airports, it is imperative that the operators of drones can
be caught and punished in order for an effective deterrence to be
established. In order to successfully apprehend drone operators, the
most important capability within a counter-UAS system is the rapid
and accurate localisation of the drone controllers. Therefore the
primary focus of this work is to develop a deep learning system that
can autonomously predict the location of a wireless drone operator
near sensitive installations such as airports and prisons.
A number of different sensor types are available for the detection
and localisation of UASs and their controllers. The sensor types
that have received substantial attention from the research commu-
nity and commercial providers are: Radio Frequency (RF) [26, 30],
Electro-Optical (EO) [13], acoustic [23] and radar [25]. As this work
focuses on the localisation of drone controllers, RF sensors must be
used. The commercial counter-UAS systems of which the authors
are aware require a human-in-the-loop in order to monitor the out-
put of the sensors and make decisions on the presence and location
of drones and their controllers. There are a number of problems
with this approach. Firstly, sites such as prisons and airports require
24-hour protection. Employing the number of skilled operators re-
quired in order to meet this requirement is costly. Furthermore, the
performance of human operators monitoring the output of sensors
is known to be low, due to limitations in human attention span [19].
Finally, it is not guaranteed that the human operator will be able to
interpret the output of the sensors optimally. For example, neural
networks can outperform cardiologists in the interpretation of data
from electrocardiograms [27].
In the context of the current problem (locating drone controllers),
the authors’ industrial partners in this project (discussed further in
Section 3) have already attempted to solve the challenge using tradi-
tional signal processing techniques, with limited success. Therefore,
it is imperative that in order to avoid the human-in-the-loop ele-
ment and make the system completely autonomous, we implement
a machine learning technique for computationally performing local-
isation. Dependence on human input would be a great disadvantage
for this system, due to the prohibitive cost of manning it around
the clock. Machine learning has proven extremely successful in
a number of domains in which hand-coded solutions have failed
and where large amounts of labelled data can be gathered [15]. In
this task, data labels can be easily generated by co-locating a GPS
receiver with the controller, as specified in Section 3.3. Moreover,
once a successful model has been found, it can easily be adapted to
new requirements (eg: new drone controller types), by training it
on an updated training set.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there has only been a
single study applying machine learning to RF data for the purpose
of detecting drones [30]. That being said, machine learning has
been applied to electro-optical [13, 29], acoustic [6, 21, 23], and
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Figure 3: Picture of RF sensor (Hyperion) hardware in de-
ployment.
radar [14, 16, 25] data for this purpose. A mixture of techniques
have been used in that work, namely: K-nearest-neighbours [23],
support vector machines [6, 14], adaptive Bayesian methods [16]
and deep learning [13, 21, 25, 29, 30]. All this work has focused
on the detection of UASs, as opposed to the localisation of the
drones or controllers. In much of this work [6, 14, 16, 23, 25], the
training and/or test data was not collected in real-world situations.
The remaining work [13, 21, 29, 30] suffered from low accuracy
and/or precision. The work presented in the remainder of this paper
focuses on the localisation of drone and controller, which is absent
in this current literature. This is important in the future of UAS
regulation, prevention and control especially with regard to the
successful prosecution of offenders.
The eventual goal of this research is to produce models which
are capable of allowing the sensors to operate fully autonomously.
That is, we aim to produce models which can predict the presence
of drones as well as the bearing of detected drones and controllers,
given the output of a single sensor. If the models are running on
two spatially separated sensors, then the locations of the controller
and drone can be calculated from these bearing values.
This paper reports on our work towards predicting the bearing of
the controllers. Work on detection as well as the bearing of drones
is ongoing and will be reported on in future publications.
2 UAS RF SIGNALS
UASs use radio signals for the transmission of the operator’s con-
trol instructions as well as for sending video and telemetry data
from the drone back to the controller. Most widely available small
UASs operate in the license-exempt bands of 2.4000 − 2.4835GHz
and 5.470 − 5.725GHz [33]. In this work, we focus on the locali-
sation of drone controllers operating in the 2.4000 − 2.4835GHz
Figure 4: Screen-shot of the control and visualisation soft-
ware of the Hyperion signal detector produced by Metis
Aerospace (metisaerospace.com).
band, as this is where the control signals of the majority of popular
commercial drones are found. However, our approach can be easily
extended to operate in other bands. Figure 2 shows a visualisa-
tion of measurements of drone video and control signals using our
hardware. In this figure, one can clearly see the Frequency-Hopping-
Spread-Spectrum (FHSS) technique [24] employed by the controller,
whereby the frequency used is constantly changing within the band.
It is interesting to observe that, at least in this instance, the con-
troller signals are timed to occur when the video signal is not being
transmitted. We have observed this pattern in all the drones which
we have studied so far. The authors believe that it is likely that this
feature is used by the trained neural networks in order to isolate
the controller signals.
3 METHODOLOGY
This work was conducted with the lead project partners Metis
Aerospace 1, based in Lincoln, UK. Metis have developed an RF
sensor product called Hyperion, capable of detecting RF signals
from drones and their controllers. This sensor is able to calculate
the RF signal power and bearing within frequency bins. A picture of
the sensor in deployment can be found in Figure 3 and a screenshot
of the associated software suite may be found in Figure 4. The
system is currently being deployed in the UK with Person-In-The-
Loop (PITL). At present, using scripts based on signal-processing
techniques, along with operator input, they are able to detect the
presence of drones within a roughly 1km radius of the sensor. They
are also able to isolate the location in time and frequency in which
the signals of the drones and controllers reside. They can then
use the bearing values within those bins to give the bearings of
the controller and the drone, relative to the sensor. By using two
sensors placed a reasonable distance apart, and by calculating the
bearing of a drone or controller relative to each sensor, they can
then calculate the position of the drone or controller. This is shown
Figure 1.
1http://metisaerospace.com/contact-us/
Boole Technology Centre, Beevor Street, Lincoln, LN6 7DJ, United Kingdom
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Figure 5: Diagram of the CNN architecture. 3D blocks represent the inputs and these are stacked into multiple channels as
features are extracted. Notice the decrease in the dimension of the inputs and the increase in the number of channels across
the network.
Figure 6: Diagram showing our method of data augmenta-
tion by time window construction. The sequence of frames
needs to be divided into windows of fixed length in order
to be fed into the CNN. Instead of dividing the sequence
of frames into non-overlapping windows (top) we divide
it into windows with a substantial amount of overlap (bot-
tom).When themodel is deployed, it uses the un-augmented
method of window construction (top).
3.1 RF Sensor Hardware
The Hyperion sensor (shown in Figure 3) consists of an omni-
directional antenna as well as a direction-finding antenna array.
This work makes use of the direction-finding array, which consists
of six circularly polarised antennae arranged hexagonally. The
antennae are each connected to a six-way RF switch, which provides
a common feed into the system receiver, a CRFS Nexus R-8. Under
control of the receiver, the RF switch selects each of the six antennae
in turn. The RF signal is routed into the receiver where the signal
is digitised and the incident angle calculations are carried out.
For this work, the sensor is configured so as to produce read-
ings in bins 30.5176kHz wide, between the frequencies 2.4GHz and
2.4998GHz. This resulted in a total of 3276 bins. For each bin, two
readings are produced: the power and the bearing of the available
signal in that bin. The sensor operates at a rate of around 300 frames
per second, where one frame is the power and bearing readings for
all 3276 bins.
3.2 Model
The hardware setup described in Section 3.1 produces around 7
billion floating point values (bearings and amplitudes) per hour.
Moreover, data augmentation techniques described in Section 3.5,
are easily capable of increasing this by 2 orders of magnitude. Fur-
thermore, the dimension of the inputs is very large. A given model
would be required to accept inputs of dimension (t , 3276, 2), where
t is the number of data frames being fed into the model. Deep learn-
ing has been demonstrated to offer the best performance on high
dimensional tasks with large training sets [9, 15] and, as such, it is
most appropriate machine learning technique to use in this work.
We decided to use a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) as
opposed to a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN). Traditionally, RNNs
have been a popular choice when applying neural networks to the
time series domain [11, 12]. This is partly due to the fact that, in
theory at least, they are able to remember events that occurred
infinitely far back in time. However, recent work has demonstrated
that CNNs can achieve better performance on a majority of se-
quence modelling [3] and video classification benchmarks [35].
They have also been responsible for recent ground-breaking results
on time-series modelling [32].
In our preliminary work, we optimised architectures for both
CNNs and RNNs. Work on RNNs involved LSTM [18] layers. We
experimented with both traditional convolutional layers, operat-
ing over individual frames, connected to LSTM layers, along with
convolutional LSTMs [36], where the convolutional layers were
themselves LSTMs. We found that the CNN architectures which
we optimised were able to achieve substantially lower error, whilst
also training faster.
The specification of the model architecture can be found in Table
1 along with a diagram in Figure 5. The associated hyperparameters
can be found in Table 2. Here, you will notice that we have followed
the advice of [3] in using dilated convolutions, in order to handle
the very large size of the input which the model received. Another
interesting feature of the model is the use of average pooling in the
first layer. Our motivation for experimenting with average pooling
was that radio data is very noisy. This is particularly severe in the
part of the spectrum inwhich ourmodel operates (2.4 - 2.49998GHz),
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Layer Name Layer Type Filter Di-
mensions
Stride Size Dilation
Size
Output
Chan-
nels
Output Dimen-
sions
Convolution 1 Convolution 12×12×2 1×1×1 3×3×1 16 200×3276×2×16
Pooling 1 Average Pooling 2×3×1 2×3×1 1×1×1 16 100×1092×2×16
Convolution 2 Convolution 12×12×2 1×1×1 3×3×1 32 100×1092×2×32
Pooling 2 Max Pooling 2×3×1 2×3×1 1×1×1 32 50×364×2×32
Convolution 3 Convolution 12×12×2 1×1×1 2×2×1 32 50×364×2×32
Pooling 3 Max Pooling 2×4×1 2×4×1 1×1×1 32 25×91×2×32
Convolution 4 Convolution 12×12×2 1×1×1 1×1×1 64 25×91×2×64
Pooling 4 Max Pooling 2×4×1 2×4×1 1×1×1 64 13×23×2×64
Convolution 5 Convolution 12×12×2 1×1×1 1×1×1 64 13×23×2×64
Pooling 5 Max Pooling 2×4×1 2×4×1 1×1×1 64 7×6×2×64
Convolution 6 Convolution 12×12×2 1×1×1 1×1×1 64 7×6×2×64
Pooling 6 Max Pooling 2×4×1 2×4×1 1×1×1 64 4×2×2×64
Fully Connected 1 Fully Connected 512 512
Fully Connected 2 Fully Connected 512 512
Output Fully Connected 1 1
Table 1: CNN Architecture. Note the use of dilated convolutions in the upper layers in order to handle the very large input
dimension. Pooling layers use equal stride an filter dimensions.
Hyperparameter Value
Activation Function (Output Layer) Linear
Activation Function (Other Layers) Relu
Loss Function Mean Absolute
Error
Optimiser Adadelta
learning rate 1
ρ 1
ϵ 0.0
Decay 0
Padding Same
Weight Initialization Glorot Normal
Bias Initialization Zeros
Number of Epochs 170
Batch Size 18
Table 2: CNN Hyperparmeters
where there are many sources of background signal, such as WiFi
and Bluetooth. The hope was that the average pooling would have
a smoothing effect on the data. Our preliminary testing showed
that using average pooling in the first layer was able to lower the
model’s error, whereas replacing the max pooling operations lower
down with average pooling had a detrimental effect.
The model was implemented using the Keras [10] framework,
with TensorFlow [1] as its backend. The model was trained for 175
epochs, taking 4.5 days on an 1 Nvidia Titan Xp GPU.
3.3 Training Data Collection
All training data were collected on a single day. The collection
was performed in rural farmland, near Lincoln, UK. Two drones
were flown: a DJI Inspire 1 2 and a DJI Mavic Air 3. The Inspire
2www.dji.com/inspire-1
3www.dji.com/mavic-air?site=brandsite&from=landing_page
was flown for three separate flights, each lasting the length of the
battery charge (9 minutes and 20 seconds, 9 minutes and 53 seconds
and 13 minutes and 40 seconds). The Mavic was flown for one such
flight (19 minutes and 8 seconds). The second flight of the Mavic
had to be cut short due to high wind conditions and so only lasted
8 minutes and 2 seconds. In order to gather more varied data, a
Futaba controller was turned on and then driven at distance around
the vicinity of the sensor. The operator of the drone controller
had a smartphone (OnePlus 5T) on his person at all times. This
smartphone logged the GPS coordinates of the controller every
second, using the GPS Logger 1 app by BasicAirDelta. Using the
GPS coordinates of the sensor, we were then able to calculate the
bearing from the sensor to the controller, as described in Section
3.4.
During collection, we insured that the drone controllers were
never less than 100 meters away from the sensor. This was to
reduce the impact that inaccuracies in the GPS location would
have on the calculation of the bearing between the sensor and the
controller. Moreover, we attempted to keep the controller within
1km of sensor, as this is its expected range. While driving with
the Futaba controller, some time was spent beyond this range limit.
Throughmanual inspection of the data, we removed all time periods
where the controller was out of range. During each drone flight,
the operator was walking at a steady pace, in order to increase
the variety of bearing labels provided to the system. Similarly, the
operator flew the drone in a variety of patterns, spending some
time hovering and other periods moving at a range of velocities.
If the sensor were deployed in urban areas, the frequency range
in which it operates (2.4 - 2.4998GHz), would contain a lot of back-
ground signals from WiFi and Bluetooth. In order to recreate this,
during certain periods of time, mobile WiFi hotspots were created
close to the sensor. Other devices were connected to these hotspots
1play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=eu.basicairdata.graziano.gpslogger&hl=en_GB
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and downloaded items from the internet, in order to ensure that
data was travelling over the network. Smartphones were also paired
to bluetooth devices such as headphones.
3.4 Data Pre-Processing
The sensor produced data in the form of frames of dimension 3276×
2. Here, the first dimension is the number of frequency bins output
by the sensor and the second represents the two values provided
by each bin: power and AoA. Section 3.1 contains further details.
The training data was normalised so that each value of each bin
had zero mean and unit variance. The means and variances used
for this normalisation were saved in order that future data used
in testing could be normalised according to the same scheme. The
radio signals of drones have certain unique temporal characteristics.
For instance, the frequency of the control signal hops with a given
period. See Section 2 for further details. In order for the model
to learn these features, multiple frames had to be combined into
windows. Preliminary testing found that windows composed of
200 frames provided a good trade-off between error and training
time. The model was, therefore, fed windows of overall dimension
200 × 3276 × 2.
Each window required an associated bearing label. During data
collection, the GPS location of the sensor and the controller were
recorded (see Section 3.3). From these values, for each controller
GPS position record, the bearing between the sensor and the con-
troller was calculated. As metadata, the hardware setup recorded
the GPS time at which each frame was measured. Similarly, the GPS
logging app used recorded the GPS time for each GPS measurement.
Each window was then assigned the bearing value recorded closest
in time to the middle, that is 100th, frame. Given that the GPS coor-
dinates of the controller were logged at a rate of 1Hz, the greatest
possible mismatch in frame and GPS times was 0.5 seconds. The
bearing values were normalised to between -1 and 1, corresponding
to −180° and 180°, respectively.
3.5 Training Data Augmentation
We used two methods to augment the training data. The first of
these was based on the construction of the time windows. Instead
of starting the next time window from where the previous one
finished (that is, 200 frames from the start of the previous time
window), we started it some number of frames s from the start of
the previous window, where s < 200. For this model, we decided to
use a value of s = 25. This provided a roughly four times increase
in the size of the training data. See Figure 6 for a diagram of this
procedure.
The hardware system was constructed such that the calibration
of the bearing outputs in each bin was not performed solely by the
physical rotation of the sensor. Rather, this could also be performed
in a software layer. The fact that the bearing calibration is not fully
performed at a hardware level, meant that we could perform data
augmentation by rotating our coordinate system. That is, we could
shift the bearing readings in each bin, as well as the bearing labels,
by a common angle α . In this work, we did two shifts to the data,
by α = 120° and α = 240°. This provided a three times increase in
the size of the training data. After applying the data augmentation,
we had a training data set of 15 606 examples.
s d β = 90° β = 45°
100m
250m 28 26
500m 74 79
300m
250m 29 13
500m 52 40
Table 3: The implied mean absolute error (in meters) in po-
sition calculation based on a mean absolute error of 3.67° in
bearing prediction by our model. See Figure 8 for a defini-
tion of symbols.
Figure 7: Training and validation error.
There has been recent work showing that data augmentation is
an effective alternative to regularisation in many task domains [17].
Our preliminary testing demonstrated that to be the case in our
particular domain. As such, no regularisation techniques were used.
Our results in Section 4 show that our model was able to generalise
very well, despite this lack of regularisation.
4 RESULTS
The model was trained on all the collected data, except for one flight
of the Mavic drone, which was held out for model validation. Over
170 epochs, the epoch with the lowest validation error (measured by
mean absolute error) had a validation error equivalent to 3.67° and
a training error equivalent to 2.56°. A plot of training and validation
errors is shown in Figure 7. It is worth calculating the localisation
error implied by this bearing error. When calculating a position
from two bearings, the error in the position calculation is given by
equation (1) [22].
ε2p =
r1r2
sinθ εα1εα2 (1)
Here, εp is the error in the position, r1 and r2 are the distances
between the controller and the first and second sensors, εα1 and εα2
are the errors in the bearings from the first and second sensors, and
θ is the angle between the two lines of bearing where they meet
over the calculated position. Figure 8 contains a diagram of these
variables. In order to calculate values for the positional error, we
assume that the error in both sensors is equal for every prediction,
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Figure 8: Symbol definitions for position error calculation.
S1 and S2 are the locations of sensors 1 and 2.C is the location
of the controller.m is the midpoint of the line connecting S1
and S2.
that is εα1 = εα2 . We choose to calculate the errors for a number
of distances d between the controller and the midpoint of the line
joining S1 and S2 and a number of distances s between S1 and S2. We
also do so for two different value of the angle β , formed at the inter-
section of the line connecting the sensors and the line connecting
the midpoint to the controller. The results of these calculations are
shown in Table 3. The addition of extra sensors would reduce this
error [22]. Moreover, it is worth noting that a large disadvantage of
using two sensors is that the position error explodes as the angle
β approaches ±180°. However, it is the intention of our industrial
partners to deploy these sensors in pairs, in order to reduce cost.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a system which is capable of autonomously
locating the controllers of UASs from their RF control signals. Al-
though there has been substantial work on the detection of UASs,
and the localisation of the aerial vehicles ,as discussed in Section 1,
to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first system capable
of locating the controllers of UASs presented in the research litera-
ture. Moreover, it is capable of doing so almost instantaneously and
with reasonable accuracy. As such, our system, or similar systems
designed using the techniques put forward in this paper, could be ef-
fectively deployed in order to apprehend the operators of drones in
dangerous and/or illegal situations. This would lead to a reduction
in the harmful uses of drones, as mentioned in Section 1.
The implied mean absolute errors in position displayed in Table
3 show that our system is able to provide reasonably accurate
locations, which could feasibly be used to apprehend an operator,
at distances of up to 500m. Beyond this distance, the accuracy of the
location finding is fairly low. However, it does still provide much
more information than only the knowledge that the controller must
be within transmission range of the drone, which is a radius of a
few kilometres.
The main strategy which we plan on following in order to reduce
this error is to improve the labelling of the data. The GPS logging
method described in 3.3 only had a refresh rate of 1Hz. This is not
sufficient for the parts of the collection where the Futaba controller
was held out of amoving car. Here, the car was travelling at upwards
of 80km/h, due to surrounding traffic. Further strategies which we
will be pursuing include the collection of more training data as well
as the optimisation of our neural network architecture.
Given that the training data contained only three different con-
troller types, it is possible that the model will not generalise well to
other, unseen, controller types. Future work will focus on collecting
data with a greater variety of controllers, as well as validating the
model on unseen controller types. Future work will also aim to
validate the system’s error in a deployment situation.
A large focus of future work will also be the training of two
further models, one for detecting the presence of UASs and the other
for locating the drone itself. The three models will be combined
into a greater system with a certain amount of higher-level control,
defined programmatically. In the default mode of this system, data
will be being fed into the detection model. When a drone is detected,
the system will switch modes and start feeding data into the two
localisation models.
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